The status of non-human animals in modern Western law is that of property. Human beings may own them, and ownership entails the right to use them as we fit and even destroy them. The animal is perceived, above all, as a good with financial value, determined according to "its" possible uses. Protecting an animal from his or her "owner" is a limitation of the owner's property rights. The perception of nonhuman animals as property is a complete contrast to that of animal rights advocates, who believe nonhuman animals have value in themselves. According to this position, animals have rights, such as the right to be spared harsh pain and the right not to be separated from their mothers right after birth-and thesecarry more weight than property rights.
The law supposedly found a way to bridge the chasm between the conflicting worldviews. This "middle way," it is evident today, grants full validity to the property rights of the owner, leaving a marginal place for the "rights" of the animals. In light of the reforms taking place before our very eyes, we must remember that a complete recognition of animal rights will not happen before their status as property is terminated. Just as the abolition of slavery was a necessary step in achieving equal rights for African-Americans in the United States, the termination of ownership rights over animals is a necessary step in the achievement of true animal rights.
Animal protection laws have existed since ancient times. Orders requiring rest for farm animals on the Sabbath appear in the Bible, as well as a prohibition against taking the eggs of a bird before her very eyes and a series of religious laws concerning animal protection. In Indian religions, the principle of "Ahimsa" - no harming, including animals - became rooted during the 6th century BC. In the 3rd century BC, Asoka, the Indian emperor, prohibited the killing of various animal species, the slaughter of pregnant or nursing animals and other practices considered especially cruel. During modern times animal protection laws resurfaced and most can be summarized as prohibiting "unnecessary suffering."
Animal protection laws have aroused a discussion - as ancient as themselves - concerning the reason for their existence. Many scholars firmly rejected the idea that animals are worthy of protection in themselves. Instead, people argued that animal protection laws for were needed for other reasons: To educate humans in self-control; to prevent violence toward human beings, which could result if people lost all restraint; to prevent mental anguish on the part of people who care about animals, and so on.
These explanations are no longer given. The Israeli Animal Welfare Act and equivalent laws in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, New Zealand and elsewhere clearly specify that their objective is to protect animals. Recently, the French civil code was amended and animals were conceptually separated from other types of property. More and more legal systems are seeking to reconcile the incompatible definitions - acknowledging them as beings with rights, but at the same time defining them as property. But if we take into consideration the fact that there is no existing legal system protecting animals from being killed for food, we will understand just how limited the scope of these rights is.
There are three major laws in Israel dealing with the protection of animals: the Wild Animal Protection Act of 1955, the Animal Welfare (Protection of Animals) Act of 1994 and the Animal Welfare (Experiments on Animals) Act of 1994.
A series of provisions in the act and the regulations enacted under it prohibit certain hunting methods, such as blinding with lights, chasing with a motorized vehicle and using traps, nets or glue. Other provisions define the hunting season, areas where hunting is prohibited, and limitations on hunting at night. Further provisions subject the entire wild animal trade to a licensing regime. The trade, possession and transportation of wild animals all require a permit. Here, too, the provisions concern all wild animals, except for those specifically declared "pests" or domesticated wild animals. Monkeys in laboratories, deer in zoos and parrots in pet stores are only a few examples of animals humans require a permit to possess.
The Nature and Parks Authority is in charge of enforcing the Wild Animal Protection Act. This agency belongs to the Ministry of the Environment. Unfortunately, enforcement of the law is insufficient. It is particularly unfortunate that the Authority regards its role as that of protecting "wildlife," but not necessarily wild animals. The authority is not concerned with the welfare of wild animals in captivity and it has granted permits in the past for the importation and possession of wild animals despite the substandard conditions awaiting them.
The act establishes a "Council for Animal Experiments," which is the main agency in charge of experiments on animals in Israel. The main roles of the council are regulating what can be done to animals used in experiments, and licensing institutes to perform experiments on animals. The council has 23 members, only three of whom are representatives of animal protection organizations. The great majority of the council members are representatives of bodies that conduct experiments on animals or represent interest groups seeking to minimize restrictions on vivisection. Many of the representatives conduct experiments on animals themselves or are in charge of animal experimentation in the institutes they work for.
The Council for Animal Experiments does not deal with permits for concrete experiments (aside from the field of cosmetics). An internal committee usually authorizes experiments in each institute. To perform an experiment, the researcher needs to be personally certified as an "authorized researcher." The director of the institute where the researcher is employed has the power to grant authorization. The material provisions of the act, which concern the protection of animals in experiments, are ambiguous and vague. Particularly acute is the instruction in clause 1 of the annex, which allows painful experiments without anesthesia. In some cases muscular relaxation is also permitted without anesthesia. Muscular relaxation paralyzes animals while they are fully conscious. The animals can still feel just as much pain, yet the researchers have no way of judging how much pain they are inflicting. The animals suffer not only excruciating pain, but also extreme feelings of helplessness.
Alongside these provisions, which create a deceptive appearance of control, the act includes no requirement that researchers publish information concerning the experiments. On the contrary, there is a secrecy provision that pertains to anyone holding a position under it and has been extensively interpreted. In light of the new Freedom of Information Act, legal challenges by animal advocates may prove successful.
An important provision in the act prohibits experimenting on animals "if it is possible to achieve the goal of the experiment through reasonable alternative methods" (clause 9). This provision, if not interpreted in a limited sense, may lead to the prohibition of most animal experiments. But who defines the goal of the experiment? And who is to determine what a reasonable alternative is? It seems that as long as the people conducting the experiments are in charge of executing the law, clause 9 will remain meaningless.
In addition to the framework prohibition, the law includes concrete prohibitions on defined types of abuse. The law specifically prohibits inciting animals to fight each other, organizing fights between animals, making an animal work who is incapable of working due to her physical condition, or making an animal work until exhaustion. Likewise, the law prohibits poisoning animals with strychnine unless it is permitted by the Director Veterinary Services (the Director Veterinary Services issued a general permit determining the conditions under which one may use strychnine). A 2001 amendment to the act prohibits cosmetic surgery on animals (such as cropping the ears and tails of purebred dogs). An "animal" is defined in this act (as in the experimentation act) as any nonhuman vertebrate. The Act does not apply to experiments on animals (governed by the experiments act) nor to the killing of animals for human consumption: Obviously, the legislator did not want to interfere with the Jewish or Muslim ritual slaughter laws.
The provision banning cruelty, torture and abuse necessitated interpretation by the Court, as these words are very loaded and can be interpreted in different ways. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in this matter in the case of 'Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprise. In this case, the court prohibited "fights" between a man and an alligator, which were taking place during shows at the alligator farm in Hamat Gader. The alligator used for the "fight" was helpless and unable to fight back, and it was proved that the animal experienced physical and mental suffering. In a beautiful and thorough verdict by Judge Mr. Mishael Heshin, the court analyzed the framework prohibition of animal abuse and identifies in it three components. The first component is factual: causing suffering to animals. The court rejected the distinction between light suffering and harsh suffering and determined that any suffering, including mental suffering, is included in the prohibition. The second component is mental: For a criminal conviction it is necessary for the person causing the suffering to be aware of the nature of his or her actions, to the fact that this is a sentient living being and that the act causes the animal suffering. For the court to issue an injunction the mental component is not needed. The court rejected a narrower interpretation of the law, according to which the prohibition would only have applied to sadistic acts, performed out of a vicious intention to cause suffering.
The third component determined by the court is a legal one: Causing suffering to an animal is prohibited only if it is done unnecessarily. And when is it justified? The test is similar to that used to determinethe constitutionality of acts restricting human rights. The suffering caused must serve a worthy purpose; it should be functionally suitable as a means to pursue that purpose; one must not exceed the minimal amount of suffering necessary to achieve the desired goal; and there should be appropriate proportionality between the severity of suffering and the importance of the pursued goal. Not every marginal goal - even if it is legitimate in itself - can justify causing an animal harsh suffering.
The third component, the legal component, allows the court to grant significant weight to the fact that animals continue to be considered property, and means in the hands of humans. It is not likely that the court will prohibit all methods of industrialized animal husbandry: In a balance between the extreme suffering of the animals and the interest of the judges in putting the carcasses of those animals on their plates, the interest of the judges is sure to win. Altogether, we can hope that the legal equilibrium will stop some of the harsher abuses of animals, including farmed animals, in areas such as the force-feeding of geese, crating of calves raised for veal, and confinement of hens to battery cages.
The Animal Welfare Act authorizes the Minister of Agriculture to set regulations on a series of subjects, which are supposed to grant concrete content to the general prohibition against torture, cruelty and abuse. Such regulations, as of 2001, mandate freezing the practice of force-feeding geese in Israel and include certain rules in relation to the manner of force-feeding (these rules do nothing more than legitimize the current practice). There is doubt as to whether these regulations are legal, because if force-feeding geese is an act of abuse, as the animal protection organizations claim, then it is prohibited under the act and cannot be permitted in regulations. Other regulations require a license for any show, exhibition, display or contest involving animals. The condition for obtaining a license is that no suffering can be inflicted on the animals during the event or while preparing for it.
One of the greatest advantages of the Animal Welfare Act is the variety of tools it provides for its enforcement. Abusing an animal is a criminal offense that carries a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment. In addition, the court may issue an injunction to prevent the abuse. Alongside the governmental enforcement, animal protection organizations were authorized to address the court as well. The Ministry of Agriculture has an officer in charge of enforcement of the act. This officer and inspectors, appointed under the act, have extensive authority. This includes the authority to transfer an animal to a protective facility in order to receive medical treatment. Other provisions deal with capturing and treating abused animals. A fund for animals is established under the Ministry of the Environment in order to promote the goals of the act. The animal abuse hot line, established under the Ministry of the Environment, receives complaints about animal abuse and follows them up. A police officer works at the hot line (the "staff officer for the Animal Welfare Act"). Another agency is the Animal Protection Unit at the Ministry of the Environment. This agency deals mainly with education and also coordinates the work of "animal trustees." The "animal trustees" are citizens appointed by the Minister of the Environment, whose authority is limited to the right to demand that a person who violated the act in front of them identify himself. As narrow as this authority might be, the trustee certificate may give further authority to attempts to convince someone to stop an act of abuse.
Despite the many tools, enforcement remains a major problem. In this matter, the actions of the public hold great importance. Detailed police complaints, backed up with testimonies and documentation of cases of abuse are basic conditions for improving enforcement. A complaint that is not backed up with evidence, or does not include information leading to identification of the abuser, is worthless. Animal protection hot line staff prepared a special form in order to facilitate the filing of detailed complaints. In order for the complaint to be properly investigated, one must also address the animal protection hot line. On matters of principle, it is advisable to also address the officer in charge of the act in the Ministry of Agriculture. The awareness and involvement of each and every compassionate person can prevent the little protection provided to animals by lawfrom becoming nothing but a series of meaningless words in the law books.
The law supposedly found a way to bridge the chasm between the conflicting worldviews. This "middle way," it is evident today, grants full validity to the property rights of the owner, leaving a marginal place for the "rights" of the animals. In light of the reforms taking place before our very eyes, we must remember that a complete recognition of animal rights will not happen before their status as property is terminated. Just as the abolition of slavery was a necessary step in achieving equal rights for African-Americans in the United States, the termination of ownership rights over animals is a necessary step in the achievement of true animal rights.
Animal protection laws have existed since ancient times. Orders requiring rest for farm animals on the Sabbath appear in the Bible, as well as a prohibition against taking the eggs of a bird before her very eyes and a series of religious laws concerning animal protection. In Indian religions, the principle of "Ahimsa" - no harming, including animals - became rooted during the 6th century BC. In the 3rd century BC, Asoka, the Indian emperor, prohibited the killing of various animal species, the slaughter of pregnant or nursing animals and other practices considered especially cruel. During modern times animal protection laws resurfaced and most can be summarized as prohibiting "unnecessary suffering."
Animal protection laws have aroused a discussion - as ancient as themselves - concerning the reason for their existence. Many scholars firmly rejected the idea that animals are worthy of protection in themselves. Instead, people argued that animal protection laws for were needed for other reasons: To educate humans in self-control; to prevent violence toward human beings, which could result if people lost all restraint; to prevent mental anguish on the part of people who care about animals, and so on.
These explanations are no longer given. The Israeli Animal Welfare Act and equivalent laws in Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, New Zealand and elsewhere clearly specify that their objective is to protect animals. Recently, the French civil code was amended and animals were conceptually separated from other types of property. More and more legal systems are seeking to reconcile the incompatible definitions - acknowledging them as beings with rights, but at the same time defining them as property. But if we take into consideration the fact that there is no existing legal system protecting animals from being killed for food, we will understand just how limited the scope of these rights is.
The Law in Israel
There are three major laws in Israel dealing with the protection of animals: the Wild Animal Protection Act of 1955, the Animal Welfare (Protection of Animals) Act of 1994 and the Animal Welfare (Experiments on Animals) Act of 1994.
The Wild Animal Protection Act
The Wild Animal Protection Act is the oldest of these laws. It regulates hunting and everything related to the possession of and trade in wild animals. A "wild animal" is extensively defined. The term covers all vertebrates aside from fish who do not naturally reside with humans. This definition includes animals born in captivity, as well, as long as they do not belong to a species that normally lives among human beings such as domestic dogs and cats. All wild animals are protected, unless their species were specifically declared "pests," "domesticated wild animals" orgame for hunters. Hunting without a license is prohibited, and this rule covers more activities than restrictions on "hunting" in the usual sense of the word. "Hunting" includes "performing an act out of an intention to harm the life, freedom or well being of a wild animal, upset her peace or endanger the natural development of her eggs or of any of her sequels." Taking turtles or frogs from a field to raise them at home is, therefore, a violation of this act, and so is harassment of a sunbathing lizard.A series of provisions in the act and the regulations enacted under it prohibit certain hunting methods, such as blinding with lights, chasing with a motorized vehicle and using traps, nets or glue. Other provisions define the hunting season, areas where hunting is prohibited, and limitations on hunting at night. Further provisions subject the entire wild animal trade to a licensing regime. The trade, possession and transportation of wild animals all require a permit. Here, too, the provisions concern all wild animals, except for those specifically declared "pests" or domesticated wild animals. Monkeys in laboratories, deer in zoos and parrots in pet stores are only a few examples of animals humans require a permit to possess.
The Nature and Parks Authority is in charge of enforcing the Wild Animal Protection Act. This agency belongs to the Ministry of the Environment. Unfortunately, enforcement of the law is insufficient. It is particularly unfortunate that the Authority regards its role as that of protecting "wildlife," but not necessarily wild animals. The authority is not concerned with the welfare of wild animals in captivity and it has granted permits in the past for the importation and possession of wild animals despite the substandard conditions awaiting them.
The Animal Welfare (Experiments on Animals) Act
The Animal Welfare (Experiments on Animals) Act regulates experiments on animals in Israel. The act, which originated in the efforts of pro-animal organizations, eventually adopted the position of the pro-vivisection lobby. Far from protecting animals, the law creates a false impression that animal experiments are well-regulated. As a result the law serves the interests of the vivisectors by lulling public concern regarding conditions for animals in laboratories.The act establishes a "Council for Animal Experiments," which is the main agency in charge of experiments on animals in Israel. The main roles of the council are regulating what can be done to animals used in experiments, and licensing institutes to perform experiments on animals. The council has 23 members, only three of whom are representatives of animal protection organizations. The great majority of the council members are representatives of bodies that conduct experiments on animals or represent interest groups seeking to minimize restrictions on vivisection. Many of the representatives conduct experiments on animals themselves or are in charge of animal experimentation in the institutes they work for.
The Council for Animal Experiments does not deal with permits for concrete experiments (aside from the field of cosmetics). An internal committee usually authorizes experiments in each institute. To perform an experiment, the researcher needs to be personally certified as an "authorized researcher." The director of the institute where the researcher is employed has the power to grant authorization. The material provisions of the act, which concern the protection of animals in experiments, are ambiguous and vague. Particularly acute is the instruction in clause 1 of the annex, which allows painful experiments without anesthesia. In some cases muscular relaxation is also permitted without anesthesia. Muscular relaxation paralyzes animals while they are fully conscious. The animals can still feel just as much pain, yet the researchers have no way of judging how much pain they are inflicting. The animals suffer not only excruciating pain, but also extreme feelings of helplessness.
Alongside these provisions, which create a deceptive appearance of control, the act includes no requirement that researchers publish information concerning the experiments. On the contrary, there is a secrecy provision that pertains to anyone holding a position under it and has been extensively interpreted. In light of the new Freedom of Information Act, legal challenges by animal advocates may prove successful.
An important provision in the act prohibits experimenting on animals "if it is possible to achieve the goal of the experiment through reasonable alternative methods" (clause 9). This provision, if not interpreted in a limited sense, may lead to the prohibition of most animal experiments. But who defines the goal of the experiment? And who is to determine what a reasonable alternative is? It seems that as long as the people conducting the experiments are in charge of executing the law, clause 9 will remain meaningless.
The Animal Welfare (Protection of Animals) Act
The Animal Welfare (Protection of Animals) Act of 1994 is the main law protectinganimals in Israel. The main article of the law is article 2(a), which sets a framework prohibition: "A person shall not torture an animal, be cruel to an animal or abuse an animal in any way."In addition to the framework prohibition, the law includes concrete prohibitions on defined types of abuse. The law specifically prohibits inciting animals to fight each other, organizing fights between animals, making an animal work who is incapable of working due to her physical condition, or making an animal work until exhaustion. Likewise, the law prohibits poisoning animals with strychnine unless it is permitted by the Director Veterinary Services (the Director Veterinary Services issued a general permit determining the conditions under which one may use strychnine). A 2001 amendment to the act prohibits cosmetic surgery on animals (such as cropping the ears and tails of purebred dogs). An "animal" is defined in this act (as in the experimentation act) as any nonhuman vertebrate. The Act does not apply to experiments on animals (governed by the experiments act) nor to the killing of animals for human consumption: Obviously, the legislator did not want to interfere with the Jewish or Muslim ritual slaughter laws.
The provision banning cruelty, torture and abuse necessitated interpretation by the Court, as these words are very loaded and can be interpreted in different ways. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in this matter in the case of 'Let the Animals Live v. Hamat Gader Recreation Enterprise. In this case, the court prohibited "fights" between a man and an alligator, which were taking place during shows at the alligator farm in Hamat Gader. The alligator used for the "fight" was helpless and unable to fight back, and it was proved that the animal experienced physical and mental suffering. In a beautiful and thorough verdict by Judge Mr. Mishael Heshin, the court analyzed the framework prohibition of animal abuse and identifies in it three components. The first component is factual: causing suffering to animals. The court rejected the distinction between light suffering and harsh suffering and determined that any suffering, including mental suffering, is included in the prohibition. The second component is mental: For a criminal conviction it is necessary for the person causing the suffering to be aware of the nature of his or her actions, to the fact that this is a sentient living being and that the act causes the animal suffering. For the court to issue an injunction the mental component is not needed. The court rejected a narrower interpretation of the law, according to which the prohibition would only have applied to sadistic acts, performed out of a vicious intention to cause suffering.
The third component determined by the court is a legal one: Causing suffering to an animal is prohibited only if it is done unnecessarily. And when is it justified? The test is similar to that used to determinethe constitutionality of acts restricting human rights. The suffering caused must serve a worthy purpose; it should be functionally suitable as a means to pursue that purpose; one must not exceed the minimal amount of suffering necessary to achieve the desired goal; and there should be appropriate proportionality between the severity of suffering and the importance of the pursued goal. Not every marginal goal - even if it is legitimate in itself - can justify causing an animal harsh suffering.
The third component, the legal component, allows the court to grant significant weight to the fact that animals continue to be considered property, and means in the hands of humans. It is not likely that the court will prohibit all methods of industrialized animal husbandry: In a balance between the extreme suffering of the animals and the interest of the judges in putting the carcasses of those animals on their plates, the interest of the judges is sure to win. Altogether, we can hope that the legal equilibrium will stop some of the harsher abuses of animals, including farmed animals, in areas such as the force-feeding of geese, crating of calves raised for veal, and confinement of hens to battery cages.
The Animal Welfare Act authorizes the Minister of Agriculture to set regulations on a series of subjects, which are supposed to grant concrete content to the general prohibition against torture, cruelty and abuse. Such regulations, as of 2001, mandate freezing the practice of force-feeding geese in Israel and include certain rules in relation to the manner of force-feeding (these rules do nothing more than legitimize the current practice). There is doubt as to whether these regulations are legal, because if force-feeding geese is an act of abuse, as the animal protection organizations claim, then it is prohibited under the act and cannot be permitted in regulations. Other regulations require a license for any show, exhibition, display or contest involving animals. The condition for obtaining a license is that no suffering can be inflicted on the animals during the event or while preparing for it.
One of the greatest advantages of the Animal Welfare Act is the variety of tools it provides for its enforcement. Abusing an animal is a criminal offense that carries a maximum sentence of three years' imprisonment. In addition, the court may issue an injunction to prevent the abuse. Alongside the governmental enforcement, animal protection organizations were authorized to address the court as well. The Ministry of Agriculture has an officer in charge of enforcement of the act. This officer and inspectors, appointed under the act, have extensive authority. This includes the authority to transfer an animal to a protective facility in order to receive medical treatment. Other provisions deal with capturing and treating abused animals. A fund for animals is established under the Ministry of the Environment in order to promote the goals of the act. The animal abuse hot line, established under the Ministry of the Environment, receives complaints about animal abuse and follows them up. A police officer works at the hot line (the "staff officer for the Animal Welfare Act"). Another agency is the Animal Protection Unit at the Ministry of the Environment. This agency deals mainly with education and also coordinates the work of "animal trustees." The "animal trustees" are citizens appointed by the Minister of the Environment, whose authority is limited to the right to demand that a person who violated the act in front of them identify himself. As narrow as this authority might be, the trustee certificate may give further authority to attempts to convince someone to stop an act of abuse.
Despite the many tools, enforcement remains a major problem. In this matter, the actions of the public hold great importance. Detailed police complaints, backed up with testimonies and documentation of cases of abuse are basic conditions for improving enforcement. A complaint that is not backed up with evidence, or does not include information leading to identification of the abuser, is worthless. Animal protection hot line staff prepared a special form in order to facilitate the filing of detailed complaints. In order for the complaint to be properly investigated, one must also address the animal protection hot line. On matters of principle, it is advisable to also address the officer in charge of the act in the Ministry of Agriculture. The awareness and involvement of each and every compassionate person can prevent the little protection provided to animals by lawfrom becoming nothing but a series of meaningless words in the law books.